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TORTS
ROBIN DOZIER OTTEN* and THOMAS J. McBRIDE**

I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey year, New Mexico appellate court decisions resulted
in various changes in tort law. The most significant of these developments
occurred because New Mexico is now a comparative fault jurisdiction.'
In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 2 the New Mexico Court
of Appeals abolished joint and several liability. In addition to this important decision, the courts dealt with other issues which arose because
of the adoption of comparative negligence. This article will review those
cases, as well as decisions of interest and practical applicability in the
areas of insurance, indemnity, the Tort Claims Act and other claims against
governmental entities, worker's compensation, and additional changes
and developments in New Mexico tort law.
I. DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADOPTION OF
COMPARATIVE FAULT
A. Abolition of joint and several liability
Pure comparative negligence is premised upon the concept that fairness
3
by making a person's fault the basis for liability. In Bartlett,
achieved
is
the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined the case law of four other
states which have judicially adopted pure comparative negligence 4 and
determined that it should abolish joint and several liability from New
Mexico common law.
The claims in Bartlett arose from an accident involving three vehicles.
An unknown driver drove the first vehicle, the plaintiff drove the second,
and the defendant's employee drove the third. The driver of the first car,
after signalling a right-hand turn, very quickly pulled into and then out
of a service station. Plaintiff Bartlett slammed on her brakes, as did the
defendant's driver, but the defendant's truck hit the plaintiffs' car.
After the parties presented the evidence, the trial court gave the jury
*Associate, Johnson and Lanphere, P.C.
**Shareholder, Johnson and Lanphere, P.C.
1. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
2. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, N.M.
3. Id.
4. These states are Alaska, California, Florida, and Michigan.

-,

648 P.2d 794 (1982).
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a comparative negligence instruction 5 and asked special interrogatories.
The jury found that the plaintiffs' damages were $100,000.00, that the
plaintiffs were not negligent, that the defendant was negligent, causing
thirty percent of the damage, and that the unknown driver was negligent,
causing seventy percent of the damage. 6 The trial court then ordered a
new trial, citing, among other reasons, 7 that "a different result would
have occurred had the jury known that this Defendant would have been
8
responsible for the total damages under joint and several liability." The
court of appeals granted defendant's application for an interlocutory appeal.
The court of appeals defined the term "joint and several liability" to
mean that "either of two persons whose concurrent negligence contributed
to cause plaintiff's injury and damage may be held liable for the entire
amount of the damage caused by them." 9 The court determined that New
0
Mexico's Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act' provides
for equitable distribution of liability for damages among persons who
have already been declared to be joint tortfeasors. The statute does not
delineate when a person is jointly or severally liable. After examining
the law with regard to joint and several liability in the states which have
judicially adopted pure comparative negligence, the court pointed out that
joint and several liability does survive in those jurisdictions. " The court
held, however, that neither of the two rationales used by courts to preserve
joint and several liability was defensible. The first of these grounds is
that a plaintiff's injury is indivisible. The rule which holds all tortfeasors
responsible for the entire loss originated in the common law notion of
the unity of the cause of action. 12 This common law notion has crumbled
as courts have become less willing to apply mere technicalities in the law
without first considering the results of such blind adherence. The New
Mexico court recognized that if a jury is able to apportion fault, certainly
5. The court instructed the jury that if it found that the defendant was negligent but also found
that the plaintiff's negligence and/or the unknown driver's negligence was also the proximate cause
of the damage, then the damage must be apportioned to each negligent party. The instruction stated
that the defendant was liable only for his percentage of fault and not for the fault attributable to the
plaintiff or the unknown third party. 98 N.M. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580.
6. Id.
7. Other reasons which the trial court cited for granting a new trial included: 1) the case should
not have been tried between plaintiffs, defendant, and the unknown driver, 2) the defendant was
jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs for all the damage, and 3) the court should not have given
the comparative negligence instruction. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-3-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
11. 98 N.M. at 154-56, 646 P.2d at 581-83.
12. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 413 (1936-37) and Note
Torts-Liability of Joint Tort-Feasors-Apportionmentof Damages Between Joint Tort-Feasors by
Verdict of Jury, 14 Va. L. Rev. 677 (1927-28).
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it is also able to apportion causation. 3 The court of appeals also rejected
the second ground on which other courts have retained joint and several
liability-to favor plaintiffs because a plaintiff should not bear the risk
of being unable to collect his judgment. 4 The court held:
Joint and several liability is not to be retained in our pure comparative
negligence system on the basis that a plaintiff must be favored. We
hold that defendant is not liable for the entire damage caused by
defendant and the unknown driver. Defendant, as a concurrent tortfeasor, is not liable on a theory of joint and several liability. '5
Thus, the court followed the concept of comparative negligence to its
most logical and reasonable conclusion by determining that all who contribute to an injury must bear the liability to the full extent, but only to
the extent of their degree of fault.
B. Punitive Damages
In Ruiz v. Southern Pacific TransportationCo.,

16

the court of appeals
addressed the issue of the proper bases for an award of punitive damages
in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. In Scott v. Rizzo, 7 an earlier
supreme court decision which adopted the Claymore v. City ofAlbuquerque 8

opinion in toto, the court listed some of the fears expressed by opponents
of the comparative fault doctrine: "Under comparative negligence, rules
designed to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence rule
are no longer needed. [Citation omitted]. With the adoption of comparative negligence, the last clear chance rule is abolished. [Citation omitted]. Also abolished is the distinction between ordinary and gross
negligence."' 9 Although the plain language of Rizzo said that the court
had eliminated the distinction between ordinary negligence and gross
negligence, a reading of Ruiz muddies the issue considerably. In Ruiz,
the court stated that although the distinction between ordinary and gross
negligence had been abolished in New Mexico, the adoption of comparative fault had not rendered impossible the recovery of punitive damages.
With regard to gross negligence the court added, "a jury might properly
find defendant's conduct to be willful, wanton, malicious, reckless, oppressive or fraudulent, or so grossly negligent as compared to plaintiff's,
that an award of punitive damages would be justified." 20
13. 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
16. 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 242, 638 P.2d 1087 (1981).
17. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
18. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 75 (Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1980), reprinted inScott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,
634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
19. 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
20. 97 N.M. at 201, 638 P.2d at 413.
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The Rizzo court did not intend the apparent abolition of the distinction
between ordinary and gross negligence to be an abolition after all. Instead,
gross negligence remains as a ground for a punitive damage award in
any case where the trier of fact finds that the plaintiff bears no fault for
the injury. The defendant's gross negligence is also a basis for an award
of punitive damages in cases where the judge or jury finds the plaintiff
to be negligent in some degree, but also finds the defendant's negligence
to be "gross" as compared to the plaintiff's negligence. Although there
have been indications since Ruiz that the New Mexico appellate courts
believe that Ruiz delineated the grounds available for punitive damages
under the comparative negligence doctrine, 2 this issue remains uncertain
in the minds of many practitioners, and clarification by the court is
warranted.
Another comment made by the court of appeals in Ruiz would be a
significant departure from previously established tort law if it became a
holding of the court. The court stated that the existence of a duty is a
question of fact rather than one of law. The court made this statement in
the context of the duty of a railroad company to fence its property in the
absence of a statute so requiring. The court said that: "whether, also,
defendants should have fenced the property, in the absence of any statutory
authority cited to us which requires it, is an argument plaintiff may be
able to suggest to the jury but it is not a negligence issue for us to decide
as a matter of law." 22 Although this comment is merely dictum in this
case, courts should consider the consequences upon the law of negligence
of adopting a position contrary to the usual rule that the existence of a
duty is a legal, not a factual question.
C. Other Issues in Comparative Fault Cases
In Martinez v. Teague,23 the issue was the applicability of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. This case involved a collision between a vehicle
driven by Mrs. Martinez and a horse owned by Mr. Teague. The jury
awarded damages in favor of Mrs. Martinez. Mr. Teague appealed; he
contended that the court should not have instructed the jury on the theory
of res ipsa loquitur because the two-pronged test had not been met.24 The
21. See Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381 (Ct. App.),
N.M. -. , 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
cert. denied, 22. 97 N.M. at 203-204, 638 P.2d at 415-16.
23. 96 N.M. 446, 631 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1981).
24. Res ipsa is applicable only if 1) the accident was the kind which usually does not occur
absent negligence; and 2) the accident was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control and management of the defendant. Id. at 449, 631 P.2d at 1317.
There were four other bases for Teague's appeal:
[1]. that the court should have declared a mistrial when the plaintiff informed
the jury that the defendant had insurance; . . .[2]. that the jury should not have
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court of appeals found that the test for res ipsa loquitur had been met by
the facts of this case.25 The court gave no hint that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was in any way affected by the adoption of comparative
fault and there is no compelling reason why the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine
should be altered by comparative negligence theory. 26 The policies underlying the two doctrines do not conflict; both can exist compatibly. It
may therefore be assumed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in New
Mexico remains as it was prior to Rizzo.
In Armstrong v. Industrial Electric and Equipment Service,27 a comparative negligence action, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court had
committed reversible error because it had refused to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction with regard to proximate cause. 28 The plaintiff
had sustained severe shocks and burns which he claimed were a proximate
result of negligent and improper installation of electrical wiring by the
defendant. The jury found that the plaintiff was one hundred percent
negligent and the defendant was not negligent. The court of appeals held
that, considering all of the jury instructions together, the jury had been
fairly apprised of the applicable law with regard to proximate cause in a
comparative negligence case. 29 Special interrogatories had been submitted
to the jury, and the answers to those interrogatories made it clear to the
court that the jury had found that no negligence of the defendant contributed to the injury of the plaintiff. The court of appeals recognized that
special verdicts or jury interrogatories are required in comparative negligence cases:30 "Special interrogatories perform an important function
in comparative negligence actions, since it is vital for the court to inquire
by way of special findings whether the negligence of either party or both
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's claimed damages." 3
been instructed that violation of certain statutes was negligence per se; [3]. that
the jury award was excessive; and (4]. that the cumulative errors committed
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
96 N.M. at 448, 631 P.2d at 1316.
25. Id. at 451, 631 P.2d at 1318.
26. Other jurisdictions have retained the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur following the adoption of
comparative fault. See, e.g., Lynden Transport, Inc. v. Haragan, 623 P.2d 789 (Alaska 198 1); Cassisi
v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So. 2d 1226
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); McLean v. Rogers, 100 Mich. App. 734, 300 N.W.2d 389 (1980).
27. 97 N.M. 272, 639 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1981).
28. The proferred instruction read:
The proximate cause of an injury is that which in a natural and continuous sequence
produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. [It
need not be the only cause, nor the last nor nearest cause. It is sufficient if it
occurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with
it, causes the injury.]
Id. at 274, 639 P.2d at 83 (brackets in original).
29. Id. at 275, 639 P.2d at 84.
30. Id. N.M. S. Ct. Order no. 8000, Misc. (Mar. 30, 1981).
31. 97 N.M. at 275, 639 P.2d at 84.
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Although this decision was the only proper one under the circumstances
in this case, it illustrates a current problem for New Mexico practitioners:
the supreme court has not adopted uniform jury instructions for comparative negligence actions. Until such instructions are adopted, judges and
trial attorneys must formulate appropriate instructions on an individual
case basis. This practice is not only time consuming, but greatly increases
the number of appeals which are taken on the ground of improper jury
instruction. The adoption of uniform jury instructions would enhance
judicial economy.
II. INSURANCE LAW
A. UninsuredMotorist Coverage
In Guess v. Gulf Insurance Co.,32 the New Mexico Court addressed
the question of whether an insured can bring a direct action against his
own insurance company on an uninsured motorist claim. In Guess, the
plaintiff sought recovery from his insurance carrier under the uninsured
motorist provision of his insurance policy for damages which resulted
from the deaths of his three minor children and injuries to a fourth child.
It was the insurance company's position that an insured must bring an
action and obtain a judgment against the uninsured motorist before he
may file suit against his own insurance company.33 The court noted that
the public policy favoring uninsured motorist insurance has been stated
in New Mexico in both case law and statute and that the statute does not
require the insured to sue the uninsured motorist first.34 Therefore, the
court held that "an uninsured motorist provision which is required by
statute to be included in a motor vehicle insurance policy allows a cause
of action on uninsured motorist claims to be raised in a direct action by
the insured against the insurance company." 35 For the court to have held
otherwise would have been detrimental to the attainment of judicial economy. This decision represents a view taken by courts in a majority of
jurisdictions which have decided the issue, 3 6 and is a practical interpretation of New Mexico law.
The New Mexico Supreme Court discussed a similar issue in Wood v.
32. 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Johnson, Commercial
Law, ante at 293.
33. 96 N.M. at 28, 627 P.2d at 870.
34. The court cited Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d
100 (1975), and N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-301(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980). 96 N.M. at 28, 627 P.2d at
870.
35. 96 N.M. at 28, 627 P.2d at 870.
36. The jurisdictions include: Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 632
(1976).
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Miller'sNational Insurance Co.37 This case involved a collision between
Wood's vehicle (which was insured by Miller's) and Gonzales' vehicle
(which was not insured). Although it would appear that Guess was controlling and should have disposed of the issue,38 the court in Wood also
examined various factors which courts in other jurisdictions have used
to determine whether an insured has the right to bring a direct action
against the insurer for uninsured motorist benefits.39 The court concluded,
insurer for
as it had in the Guess case, that a direct action against an
40
uninsured motorist benefits is permissible in New Mexico.
State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kiehne41 was the third case
decided this year which involved uninsured motorist coverage. In that
case, the insurance policy provided uninsured motorist coverage on several vehicles owned by the Kiehnes, but the policy included an endorsement excluding coverage under the policy whenever Earl Craig Kiehne
drove one of the insured vehicles. The accident which was the subject
of the insurance claim occurred while Earl Craig Kiehne was driving one
of the insured vehicles. The Holdens, as personal representatives of the
estate of Richard Holden, a passenger in Kiehne's car who was killed in
the accident, sued both the Kiehnes and State Farm under the uninsured
motorist provisions of the policy. The trial court decided that State Farm
was not liable to the Holdens under the policy.
On review, the appellate court first found that the exclusionary provision
was not ambiguous and, therefore, was enforceable. 42 In addition, the
court found that enforcement of the exclusionary provision did not violate
the policy behind the uninsured motorist statute. The court observed that
the uninsured motorist statute is not mandatory, and so Mr. Kiehne's
decision to exclude coverage, including uninsured motorist coverage, at
such times as Earl Craig Kiehne was driving the insured vehicles, did
not violate the legislature's intent in adopting the uninsured motorist
provisions. 43 This case establishes at least one set of circumstances in
which an exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage from an insurance
policy is enforceable.
37. 96 N.M. 525, 632 P.2d 1163 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Johnson,
Commercial Law, ante at 293.
38. The New Mexico Supreme Court decided Guess on May 4, 1981, and Wood on August 24,
1981; it is curious that the court elected to discuss the issue more extensively in the second case
than in the first.
39. The factors included: "1) legislative intent in enacting the statute requiring uninsured motorist
coverage; 2) the insurer's intent in drafting the provision; 3) judicial economy; 4) the meaning of
the phrase 'legally entitled to recover'; and 5) the effect of an arbitration provision." 96 N.M. at
528, 632 P.2d at 1166.
40. Id.
41. 97 N.M. 470, 641 P.2d 501 (1982).
42. Id. at 471, 641 P.2d at 502.
43. Id.
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B. Intrafamily Immunity
A second issue in Guess v. Gulf Insurance Co." was the validity of
the public policy which barred suits between parents and children. New
Mexico courts have long accepted this prohibition. 45 The court recognized
that most intrafamily immunities, including intraspousal immunity for
and non-intentional torts, have been abolished in New Mexintentional
ico. 46 The court could find no stronger public policy in favor of barring
intrafamily suits between parents and children than had existed for barring
intraspousal suits. Although some may see this abolition of parent-child
immunity as a further weakening of familial relationships, the court's
observation that such relationships are affected to a much greater extent
by the parties' conduct underlying a lawsuit represents a realistic appraisal
of today's societal attitudes.
C. Arbitration
The insurance policy at issue in Wood v. Miller's National Insurance
Co. 47 contained an arbitration clause. At trial, plaintiff and defendant
insurance company disputed the fact that a valid agreement of arbitration
existed between them. The trial court found no valid agreement and that,
irrespective of an agreement, the insurance company had waived its right
to compel arbitration.48 The case involved a collision between Wood,
who was insured by Miller's, and Gonzales, who was uninsured. Gonzales
brought suit against Wood and Miller's undertook Wood's defense and
suggested that Wood counterclaim. Wood demanded that Miller's reimburse him under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy for costs
sustained as the result of his own injuries. In addition, he asked for
arbitration if the insurance company did not pay. Miller's declined to pay
for Wood's expenses but suggested that, although it was willing to arbitrate, arbitration costs might be avoided by accepting the determination
of liability between Wood and Gonzales which was made in that lawsuit. 4 9
Wood did not accept this suggestion. The trial court based its finding that
the insurance company waived its right to compel arbitration upon the
following order of proceedings: Wood filed suit against Miller's alleging
that the insurance company's denial of coverage was not in good faith;
Miller's filed a motion to dismiss which the court denied; Miller's then
filed a motion to compel arbitration.
44. 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981).
45. See Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 427 P.2d 655 (1967); Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139,
420 P.2d 127 (1966).
46. 96 N.M. at 29, 627 P.2d at 871.
47. 96 N.M. 525, 632 P.2d 1163 (1981).
48. Id. at 527, 632 P.2d at 1165.
49. Id. at 526-27, 632 P.2d at 1164-65.
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The supreme court noted that the seminal New Mexico case on the
issue of waiver of the right to arbitration is United Nuclear Corp. v.
GeneralAtomic Co.50 In United Nuclear, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reiterated its policy favoring arbitration and stated that a claim of waiver
of the right to compel arbitration cannot be sustained absent a showing
of prejudice to the party opposing arbitration. Such prejudice usually
consists of substantial trial preparation undertaken by the opposing party
in the mistaken belief that the other party does not desire to arbitrate.
In Wood, Miller's had moved to dismiss the lawsuit, thereby invoking
the court's discretionary power. Only after the trial court denied this
motion did Miller's move to compel arbitration. The court held that under
these circumstances, Miller's had waived its right to arbitration. The
court further clarified the point which must necessarily be reached before
waiver may be found:
The point of no return is reached when the party seeking to compel
arbitration invokes the court's discretionary power, prior to demanding arbitration, on a question other than its demand for arbitration. . . To hold otherwise would permit a party to resort to court
action until an unfavorable result is reached and then switch to arbitration. We cannot sanction such a procedure. 5
As a result of this case, the policy in New Mexico in favor of arbitration
remains strong. The basis upon which a claim of waiver may be made,
however, has become more easily ascertainable.
III. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
The New Mexico Court of Appeals decided Dessauer v. Memorial
General Hospital52 before the abolition of joint and several liability; this
case therefore lends no guidance to the New Mexico practitioner with
respect to the effect of the Bartlett decision upon the doctrines of contribution and indemnity. By abolishing joint and several liability, the court
also removed the basis for contribution claims. If no defendant ever pays
a part of a judgment which is proportionately larger than his share of
fault, then no defendant can bring equitable claims against joint tortfeasors
for contribution.53 On the other hand, the abolition of joint and several
liability did not undermine the theory of indemnity, which is based upon
vicarious liability.
Dessauer presents a discussion of the relative positions of a hospital,
50. 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290 (1979).
51. 96 N.M. at 527-28, 632 P.2d at 1165-66.
52. 96 N.M. 92, 628 P.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1981).
53. The discussion of contribution would become pertinent again if legislative or judicial action
reversed the effect of the Bartlett decision and reinstated joint and several liability.
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a doctor, and a nurse who become defendants in a wrongful death action
tried in a jurisdiction which recognizes the comparative fault rule. While
the case presents little that is new, it is useful because it reiterates the
bases of the doctrine of indemnity in light of comparative fault. In the
Dessauer case, the estate of the deceased entered into a settlement with
the hospital and the nurse. These two defendants then sued the doctor
for contribution and indemnity. The jury denied the claims made by the
hospital and the nurse, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.
The court of appeals held that the claims of the nurse against the doctor
were different from those of the hospital against the doctor because the
liability of the doctor with respect to the nurse differed from that of the
doctor with respect to the hospital.54 With regard to the nurse, the doctor
could be held liable only on a theory of respondeat superior. Therefore,
the nurse had no claim for indemnification against the doctor because she
was the primary wrongdoer.5 5 The court reasoned that because the jury
found that the doctor was not negligent and that the hospital was negligent,
the hospital's claims against the doctor were based on his assumed vicarious liability for the nurse's negligence. Therefore, unless the nurse
was liable to the hospital, the doctor could not be liable to the hospital.
It would be inappropriate for the doctor to indemnify the hospital when
the hospital was a tortfeasor in paridelicto with the nurse, and the doctor's
56
liability was only derivative from that of the nurse.
One basis of the hospital's and nurse's appeal was that the trial court
had erred in refusing to give a borrowed servant instruction. The court
of appeals held that the instruction was properly refused because: "(1) it
failed to distinguish between the claims of the hospital and the nurse; (2)
it failed to distinguish between contribution and indemnity; and (3) the
instruction was inapplicable, in this case, under all of the distinctions.-5
54. 96 N.M. at 97, 628 P.2d at 342.
55. Id. In addition, the nurse could not obtain contribution from the doctor because his liability
was based only upon her negligence. The court noted that contribution is not allowed unless the
party claiming contribution has paid more than its pro rata share. Because the doctor's liability was
based on the nurse's negligence, the nurse could not be said to have paid more than her pro rata
share. The court dismissed the faulty reasoning which formed the basis of the nurse's claims, stating
that:
If the master may obtain indemnity from a servant, for whose tort the master has
responded in damages, it is totally illogical to think the servant may claim a right
to contribution or indemnity from the innocent master once the servant has paid
his liability to the injured plaintiff. The doctrine of vicarious liability was fashioned
to provide a remedy to the innocent plaintiff, not to furnish a windfall to a solvent
wrongdoer.
Id. at 98, 628 P.2d at 343.
56. Id. Similarly, the hospital's contribution claim against the doctor was also based upon the
negligence of the nurse. The hospital's contribution claim against the doctor was without merit when
the nurse and the hospital were joint tortfeasors unless the nurse had failed to pay her pro rata share
of the liability. Because there was no evidence that this was the case, the hospital's claim for
contribution against the doctor also failed. Id. at 98-99, 629 P.2d at 343-44.
57. Id. at 99, 628 P.2d at 344.
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The instruction was properly refused under the court's first and second
reasons. At the time the court refused the instruction, however, the jury
had not yet answered the special interrogatory with respect to the doctor's
negligence. In addition, it is unclear from the opinion how it was established that the nurse was not solely the agent of the doctor rather than
the agent of the hospital. Without that data, it would be impossible to
arrive at the court's third conclusion that the instruction was inapplicable
to this case. Indeed, if the nurse were the doctor's borrowed servant and
were, at that time, not the hospital's agent, the doctor could be liable to
indemnify the hospital if the jury found no other agent of the hospital
guilty of negligence. In such a case, a court should give a borrowed
servant instruction which properly states the law. 8
The court of appeals also addressed the issue of indemnity in Plumbers
Specialty Co. v. Enterprise Products Co. 9 In this case, Ramona Romero
alleged that she suffered injuries resulting from defective manufacturing
or defective packaging of "Drain Devil." She sought damages from,
among others, the plaintiff and defendant in the instant case. Enterprise
refused to defend Plumbers against Romero's charges. The parties settled
the lawsuit before jury selection was completed, by Plumbers and Enterprise each contributing $7500.00 to Romero. Plumbers then brought
this case against Enterprise for its costs in defending the suit and payment
of the settlement.' The judgment of the trial court was in favor of Plumbers
based upon its indemnity agreement with Enterprise. 6 Because the agreement was the basis of the judgment, Enterprise's argument that a defendant need not indemnify another unless the defendant-indemnitor is
primarily liable could not prevail. The court of appeals accepted the
rationale of the Michigan Court of Appeals in Trim v. Clark Equipment
Co.62 In that case, the court required that only potential rather than actual
liability be shown as the basis of the settlement in order for a settling
party to recover on a contract of indemnity. The Michigan court went on
to explain that potential liability means that the indemnitee acted reasonably in settling the underlying suit. The New Mexico court found that
Plumbers had acted reasonably with regard to the amount paid in settlement, in light of the risk of exposure. The further evidence that Enterprise
had paid an identical amount in settlement reinforced the court's determination that the amount was reasonable.63
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 11.24.
96 N.M. 517, 632 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 519, 632 P.2d at 754.
Id. at 521, 632 P.2d at 756.
87 Mich. App. 270, 274 N.W.2d 33 (1978).
96 N.M. at 523, 632 P.2d at 758.
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IV. TORTS COMMITTED BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
The New Mexico appellate courts addressed a number of tort issues
in cases in which the defendants were governmental entities. Some of64
these cases warrant a brief discussion. In Cardoza v. Town of Silver City,
the issue was whether a municipality must receive notice of a defect in
one of its streets before it can be held liable for damages resulting from
the defect. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when he drove his
automobile over a manhole cover on a Silver City street. The jury awarded
damages to the plaintiff. Among other claims on appeal, the city alleged
that it had not received proper notice of the defect. The court of appeals
found that the applicable jury instruction contained the proper statement
of New Mexico law on the subject. This jury instruction states that: "[a]
city has a duty to use ordinary care to maintain [streets] [sidewalks] in
a safe condition." 65 The court held that a violation of this duty established
the liability of the municipality regardless of whether the plaintiff gave
actual or constructive notice. 66
Another case decided this year also involved notice, this time under
the notice provision of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 67 Ferguson v.
New Mexico State Highway Commission68 was a personal injury and
wrongful death case resulting from an accident which occurred on June
11, 1977, on New Mexico State Road 124 in Valencia County. The
plaintiff brought suit on June 6, 1979, and the state moved to dismiss on
the grounds that notice had not been given within the statutory period
under the Tort Claims Act. The statute requires that a claim must be made
by giving written notice of the time, place, and circumstance of the injury
"within 90 days after an occurrence giving rise" to the claim unless the
69
governmental entity involved has actual knowledge of the occurrence.
In this case, the New Mexico State Police investigated the accident on
June 11, 1977, and filed an official accident report. The court of appeals
perceived that the initial question was whether this official report constituted actual knowledge of the occurrence by the state. The State Police
distributed one of the copies of the accident report to the State Highway
Department. On this basis, the court held that the state had actual knowledge of the occurrence and, therefore, the motion to dismiss had been
improperly granted.70 This case represents a commendable effort by the
64. 96 N.M. 130, 628 P.2d 1126 (Ct. App. 1981).
65. N.M. UJI. Civ. 13.17.
66. 96 N.M. at 134, 628 P.2d at1130.
67. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 through -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as the
Tort Claims Act]. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), contains the notice provision of
the Tort Claims Act.
68. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1077 (Ct. App. June 11,1981).
69. Id. at1078.
70. Id. at1078-79.
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court of appeals to resist the temptation to require more paperwork from
citizens interacting with the state. Reduction of such requirements would
not only have enhanced efficiency of state government, but would also
have contributed to a more positive attitude among citizens that dealing
with the state need not be a frustrating or futile experience.
Unfortunately, in New Mexico State Highway Commission v. Ferguson,7 the supreme court found that the court of appeals had not given
effect to the legislative intent of the notice provision of the Tort Claims
Act. The supreme court, therefore, reversed the court of appeals decision,
stating that the purpose of that notice provision "is to ensure that the
72
agency allegedly at fault is notified that it may be subject to a lawsuit."
Tompkins v. CarlsbadIrrigationDistrict73 also involved the applicability of the Tort Claims Act. This case was a wrongful death action which
resulted from the drowning of a toddler in water standing in a culvert
which had been designed to carry irrigation ditch water under a highway.
The court of appeals first had to determine whether the Carlsbad Irrigation
District was a governmental entity for the purposes of the Tort Claims
Act. After reviewing the applicable statutes, 74 the court held that the
Carlsbad Irrigation District was a governmental entity.75 The court then
had to determine whether section 41-4-6,76 which limits the waiver of
immunity of governmental entities contained in section 41-4-4(A) 77 barred
the claim made by the plaintiff in the instant case. The court held that
the case could not be maintained on the basis of section 41-4-678 because
that section is not a waiver of immunity for damages arising out of the
operation or maintenance of works used for diversion or storage of water.79
The court did find, however, that a claim such as that made by the plaintiff
in this case could be maintained on the basis of section 41-4-11, which
71. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1345 (Sept. 27, 1982).
72. Id. at 1347.
73. 96 N.M. 368, 630 P.2d 767 (Ct. App. 1981).
74. 96 N.M. at 370-71, 630 P.2d at 769-70. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1982),
contains definitions of terms such as "governmental entity," "local public body," and "state" or
"state agency."
75. 96 N.M. at 370, 630 P.2d at 769.
76. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
78. Section 41-4-6 provides:
Liability; buildings, public works, machinery, equipment and furnishings.
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA 1978
does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any
building, public park, machinery, equipment or furnishings. Nothing in this
section shall be construed as granting waiver of immunity for any damages
arising out of the operation or maintenance of works used for diversion or
storage of water.
79. 96 N.M. at 371, 630 P.2d at 770.
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renders the grant of immunity inapplicable to claims resulting from negligent maintenance of certain structures. 80 The court agreed with plaintiff's
contention that this statute waived immunity for negligent maintenance
or existence of a culvert.
On April 14, 1981, the New Mexico Court of Appeals decided two
cases 81 which involved claims resulting from injury inflicted upon jail
inmates by their fellow prisoners. The primary import of these decisions
is that, for the first time in New Mexico, the court established affirmative
duties of jailers to inmates. Before these cases, the duty of a jailer had
been expressed in the broadest negligence terms; the jailer had to "exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the protection of the life and health
of the person in custody." 8 2
In Methola v. County of Eddy,83 the court of appeals held that when
the evidence shows that the severe beatings repeatedly inflicted upon the
inmate occurred without intervention by jail personnel, the question of
foreseeability of danger at the time the )ailers placed the inmate in his
cell was no longer pertinent.84 Rather, negligence was imputed to the
jailers because of their failure to:
(1) provide for adequate monitoring of activity in the cells to prevent
such conduct; (2) make adequate and periodic cell inspections to
learn the condition of those in custody; (3) sufficiently supervise and
account for the presence and safety of all prisoners in the custody
of jail officials; and (4) adequately protect those who, in the exercise
of the jailers' reasonable and ordinary care, the jailer would have
learned were in need of protection."s
In Doe v. City of Albuquerque,86 jail inmates had suffered beatings by
80. Id. at 371-72, 630 P.2d at 770-71. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), reads:
A. The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while
acting within the scope of their duties in the maintenance of or for the existence
of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
B. The liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsection
A of this section shall not include liability for damages caused by:
(1)a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street,
alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
(2) the failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
81. Methola v. County of Eddy, 96 N.M. 274, 629 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1981); Doe v. City of
Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 433, 631 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1981).
82. City of Belen v. Harrell, 93 N.M. 601, 603, 603 P.2d 711, 713 (1979).
83. 96 N.M. 274, 629 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1981).
84. Id.at 277, 629 P.2d at 353.
85. Id.
86. 96 N.M. 433, 631 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1981).
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fellow inmates in the Bernalillo County Detention Center. The court of
appeals reiterated the standard of care for jailers:
[lI]t is the law in New Mexico that when a governmental entity through
its agents, by virtue of its law enforcement powers has arrested and
imprisoned a human being, it is bound to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care, under the circumstances, for the preservation of his
life and health. [Citation omitted.] The duty of care is one owing to
a person in custody by virtue of such powers, and for a breach of

that duty, the custodial entity is responsible in damages.87

It is encouraging that the court has delineated the standard of care for
jailers in an attempt to prevent beatings of inmates such as those inflicted
upon the plaintiffs in these companion cases.
In Methola, the court made another point with regard to damages which
may be of more universal interest to New Mexico practitioners than the
issue of a jailer's duty of care. The court of appeals emphasized that:
"whether there is any evidence of past earnings or of any decrease in
plaintiff's earning capacity, proof of a continuing disability or an irreparable physical injury is all that is needed to permit the fact-finder to
'award substantial damages' for loss of wage-earning ability."88 The proper
measure of damages for plaintiff was, therefore, held to be not only the
projected cost of a lifetime of custodial care, but also an amount to
compensate for loss of wage-earning ability. Because damages are awarded
in an attempt to make the injured person whole, this formula is equitable
when the injured person actually lost wage-earning ability as a result of
the defendant's tortious conduct. When, however, the record is bereft of
evidence that the plaintiff's incompetent had the ability to provide an
income prior to the injury, this measure of damages accomplishes more
on the plaintiff's behalf than intended.
The fact that there is no federal statute of limitation governing claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 198389 was a subject of discussion by the New Mexico
Court of Appeals and the United States District Court during the Survey
year. In Gunther v. Miller,9 the United States District Court for the District
of New Mexico recognized that because there is no applicable federal
statute of limitations, the most appropriate state limitations period becomes the controlling limitation period. The district court did not accept
defendant's argument that the Tort Claims Act two-year statute of limitation 9'
should be used because tort claims brought under that Act were the most
analogous state causes of action. The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

96 N.M. at 438, 631 P.2d at 733.
96 N.M. at 279, 629 P.2d at 355.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §44-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
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Court of Appeals 92 that tort claims acts are based on "state concepts of
sovereign immunity

. . .

alien to the purposes to be served by the Civil

Rights Act." 93 The court also agreed with the plaintiff's contention that
the applicable period was either three years (the limitation for personal
injuries) 94 or four years (the limitation for miscellaneous claims). 5 It was
not necessary for the court to decide which limitation applied because
neither period had run.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in DeVargas v. State ex rel. New
Mexico Departmentof Corrections,96 rejected the reasoning of the federal

court and held that Gunther should not be followed. The court did not,
however, decide whether the three-year period of limitation provided in
personal injury actions97 or the two-year period provided by the Tort
Claims Act 98 should be the applicable period. Such a choice was unnecessary because either period barred the plaintiff's claims. But in an
'
the supreme court held that
opinion entitled "Decision on Certiorari," 99

the two-year period provided by the Tort Claims Act was the appropriate
limitations period. It therefore appears that section 1983 actions may be
brought in federal court an additional year after they would be barred
from state courts by the statute of limitations.l°0
V. INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES NOT COVERED BY

WORKER'S COMPENSATION
In two cases decided during the Survey year by the New Mexico
appellate courts, workers were injured under circumstances which did
not qualify them to receive worker's compensation benefits. In the first
of these cases, Adamchek v. Gemm Enterprises, Inc.,' 0 the worker was
accidently shot by his employer while he was working as a cook in the
defendant's restaurant. The supreme court considered whether the remedy
92. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970).
93. Id. at 742.
94. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8 (1978).
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. §37-1-4 (1978).
96. 97 N.M. 450, 640 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166
(1982). For a further discussion of this case, see Note, Federal Civil Rights Act-The New Mexico
Appellate Courts' Choice of the Proper Limitations Period for Civil Rights Actions Filed Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983: DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections, post at 555.
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8 (1978).
98. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
99. DeVargas v. State ex rel. N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
100. See Kovnat, Constitutional Torts and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 1,
45 (1983), for an extensive discussion of the appropriate state statute of limitations in § 1983 actions.
Professor Kovnat noted that the question of the appropriate state limitations period is a matter of
federal law.
101. 96 N.M. 24, 627 P.2d 866 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Kelly, Workmen's
Compensation, post at 495.
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provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act °2 was the exclusive remedy available to Adamchek.' 0 3 The threshold question in the case was
whether the accidental shooting was a risk incident to the work itself. If
so, the Workmen's Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy. If
not, Adamchek would be free to bring a personal injury action against
his employer. The court held that there was no basis for finding that the
wound arose from a danger which was peculiar to Adamchek's work as
a cook. 0 4 Therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not provide
the exclusive remedy. In this decision, the court correctly refused to use
the Workmen's Compensation Act to limit an employer's liability and to
relieve the employee from the requirement of proving negligence in the
absence of those policy considerations' 5 which underlie workmen's compensation laws.
Gutierrez v. Kent Nowlin Construction Co., 06 was a wrongful death
action brought under the Wrongful Death Act °7 on behalf of the estate
of the deceased who was killed while in the course and scope of his
employment for the defendant. The deceased's widow and minor children
were residents of the Republic of Mexico at the time of the accident.
The parties appeared to agree that the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy when the Act applies.'O
However, under the Act, the survivors of this worker were not eligible
for compensation because they were not residents of the United States at
the time of the injury. 09 The New Mexico Wrongful Death Act contains
no such limitation." 0 The defendant argued that the remedy provided by
the Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive and that, therefore, the
survivors could not bring their claim. The court of appeals held for the
plaintiff, relying on the state supreme court decision of Pedrazza v. Sid
102. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-1-1 through -69 (1978).
103. 96 N.M. at 25, 627 P.2d at 867.
104. Id. at 27, 627 P.2d at 869.
105. These well-established policy considerations include simplifying trials by not requiring a
claimant to show negligence on the part of the employer, and facilitating determination of amount
of awards.
106. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 293 (Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1981), cert. granted.
107. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2-1 through -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
108. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 295-96. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-1-6(D), 52-1-8, 52-1-9 (1978).
109. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-52 (1978), provides that:
Compensation shall be exempt from claim of creditors and from any attachment, garnishment or execution, and shall be paid only to such workman or
his personal representative, or such other persons as the court may, under the
terms hereof, appoint to receive or collect the same. No claim or judgment for
compensation, under this act . . . shall accrue to or be recovered by relatives
or dependents not residents of the United States at the time of the injury of
such workman.
110. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
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Fleming Contractor, Inc.' Pedrazza held that although the Worker's
Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy between the employer
and the employee, dependents who were not covered by the Act were
not barred from using other legal remedies to recover for the injury of
the worker." 2
The court also held in Gutierrez that the fellow servant doctrine is no
longer viable in New Mexico. The court noted that assumption of the
risk as an affirmative defense had been abolished in New Mexico. '"3 The
court had no doubt that the supreme court intended to abolish the fellow
servant doctrine at the same time it abolished the defense of assumption
of the risk. " 4 Like the abolished defense, the fellow servant doctrine had
also outlived the social policy of fostering industrialization which originally necessitated the doctrine.
VI. OTHER TORT THEORIES AND DEFENSES
The New Mexico Court of Appeals considered the collateral source
doctrine in Jojola v. Baldridge Lumber Co. "' The court observed that
the "'collateral source' doctrine is a general law of damages" which
prohibits a wrongdoer from reducing or mitigating damages by showing
that the party seeking relief has been partly or completely compensated6
by insurance, unless the insurance was purchased by the wrongdoer."
In the Jojola case, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court had erred when
it allowed evidence of plaintiff's worker's compensation to be presented
to the jury. At trial, plaintiff had testified that he was destitute. During
cross-examination, the defendant asked to what extent the medical bills
had been paid. The plaintiff responded that his medical bills had been
paid by workmen's compensation.'
The court of appeals held that admission of the evidence did not constitute error because:
(1) no amount of compensation was named that was paid plaintiff
for doctor bills; (2) the jury did not get to the issue of damages
because it rendered a verdict for defendants [citation omitted]; (3) it
is not erroneous when used to test the credibility of a plaintiff who
claims he had fallen behind in his bills and wanted to catch up on
them and support his family [citations omitted]; or (4) where defendant seeks to impeach plaintiff who testified that he went back to
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980).
94 N.M. at 62, 607 P.2d at 601.
Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971).
21 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 300-301.
96 N.M. 761,635 P.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id.at 765, 635 P.2d at 320.
Id.
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work because he needed money for support of his family [citation
omitted]. Is

By mentioning these factors, the court of appeals gave practitioners some
helpful guidance when faced with the dilemma of determining what evidence is admissible under the collateral source rule.
In Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Jasso, 9 the court of appeals
discussed the limits of damages which a public utility can recover. PNM
had received a judgment against Mr. Jasso for damages incurred by his
negligent collision with a utility pole. Mr. Jasso had refused to pay two
portions of the bill which PNM had submitted to him-percentage charges
for fringe benefits and other overhead costs. The issues on appeal were
whether Jasso was liable for these charges and whether he should be
allowed to offset depreciation on the pole. 20
Because this was an issue of first impression in New Mexico, the court
looked at the law of other jurisdictions in making its determination. 2 '
The evidence presented at trial showed that PNM charged all fringe benefit
expenses to the rate payers. Therefore, the court held, "these expenses
cannot be viewed as a loss to PNM."' 22 Because the purpose of damages
is not to allow an injured party to profit from his injury, but rather only
to compensate him, PNM could not recover these costs. Logically, the
court used the same reasoning to allow Jasso to offset23depreciation of the
twenty-seven year old pole which he had damaged.
During the Survey year, the court of appeals refused to expand the
strict product liability theory in New Mexico. In Ortiz v. Gas Co. of New
Mexico, 124 the court held that the theory of strict product liability "does
not encompass holding a utility strictly liable for the safety of appliances25
which utilize its product, or for the manner in which its product is used."
In Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,' 26 the court of appeals
also addressed the issue of strict liability. The court noted that New Mexico
has not recognized the theory of a landowner's strict liability except in
cases involving the use of explosives. 27 In addition, the court found
118. Id.
119. 96 N.M. 800, 635 P.2d 1003 (Ct. App. 1981).
120. Id.at 801, 635 P.2d at 1004.
121. The court looked at cases from Alaska, Illinois, New York, Oklahoma, and the Tenth Circuit.
Id.at 801-802, 635 P.2d at 1004-1005.
122. Id.at 802, 635 P2d at 1003.
123. Id.
124. 97 N.M. 81, 636 P.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1981). The plaintiffs in this case suffered carbon
monoxide poisoning when the gas furnace in their rented apartment released carbon monoxide and
the hot water heater was not properly vented.
125. Id.at 83, 636 P.2d at 902.
126. 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 242, 638 P.2d 1087
(1981). See supra text accompanying notes 16-22 for further discussion of this case.
127. 97 N.M. at 200, 638 P.2d at 412.
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Restatement of Torts (Second) section 402A inapplicable because the
plaintiff in this case was a trespasser in a railroad yard and not a user or
consumer of a product. 128
The New Mexico Supreme Court examined applicability of exceptions
to the general rule that an employer is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor. In Budagher v. AMREP Corp., 29 AMREP owned
property on the mesa above Budagher's property and graded the mesa to
prepare it for development as a residential area. AMREP hired an independent engineering firm which prepared a report calling for the construction of three dams and a drainage culvert to prevent runoff of surface
water from the mesa to the area below. AMREP had the dams built but,
nevertheless, in 1974 and 1975, floods damaged the Budagher house and
two lots. When Budagher brought suit against AMREP, AMREP claimed
that the negligence of an independent contractor caused the damage to
the Budagher property. The jury verdict was in favor of AMREP. Budagher appealed to the court of appeals which affirmed the trial court. '3 0
The supreme court granted certiorari.
In its opinion, the supreme court noted that one exception to the general
rule barring liability for the negligence of independent contractors is that
"one who employs an independent contractor to do the work, which the
employer should recognize as likely to create a peculiar risk of harm to
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for the
failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care in taking the precautions. " ' The court discussed two other exceptions to the general rule
and found that they also applied. First, one who employs an independent
contractor to do work which is especially dangerous to others will be
liable if the contractor fails to take reasonable precautions against the
danger.' Second, when an employer hires an independent contractor to
perform work which the employer knows or has reason to know is likely
to cause a trespass upon the land of another or create a public or private
nuisance, the employer is liable for the harm of trespass or nuisance
regardless of the independent contractor rule. 133 The court held that,
because the landowner's duty to "refrain from artificially obstructing or
diverting the natural flow of surface waters so as to cause it to flow in a
different volume or at a different rate than it would have flowed but for
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
97 N.M. 116, 637 P.2d 547 (1981).
Id. at118, 637 P.2d at549.
Id. at 119-20, 637 P.2d at550-51 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §416 (1965)).
97 N.M. at119-20, 637 P.2d at550-51. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 (1965).
97 N.M. at120, 637 P.2d at551. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §427(B) (1965).
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the artificial channels" 114 was non-delegable, the independent contractor
rule did not apply.
In a libel case, Kutz v. Independent PublishingCo., 35 the New Mexico
Court of Appeals applied the United States Supreme Court decision in
Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 31 6 in which the Supreme Court had held that opinion
can never be actionable even if defamatory. The cause of action in Kutz
arose from an article which appeared in the defendant's weekly newspaper.137 The defendant argued that the statement was opinion and, therefore, absolutely privileged. The court first had to determine whether the
question as to whether a statement was fact or opinion was an issue of
law for the court to decide or an issue of fact for the trier of fact. The
court noted that the California Supreme Court had held the question to
be a matter of law, but only when "the statement unambiguously constitutes either fact or opinion. Where . . . the allegedly libelous remarks
could have been understood by the average reader in either sense, the
issue must be left to the jury's determination."' 3 8 In order to decide
whether the question was fact or law, the court of appeals noted that
courts look to see if the material claimed to be libelous contains full
disclosure of the facts upon which the alleged opinion is based so that
the reader could reach his own opinion. If so, the issue becomes one of
law and the statement is an opinion which is absolutely privileged.13 9
Using the test formulated in other jurisdictions, the court of appeals
held that the paragraph under scrutiny did not contain sufficient disclosure
of the bases of the publisher's opinion so as to qualify the paragraph to
be an opinion as a matter of law. 140 The court also noted that there seemed
to be conflict between the applicable uniform jury instructions 41 and the
opinion and fact distinctions drawn by the United States Supreme Court.
The court suggested that an adaptation of these instructions would have
to be resolved by the trial court. A more efficient solution to this conflict
would be for the Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions to review the
instructions and to make the changes required to bring them into accord
with the United States Supreme Court's statement of the common law.
134. 97 N.M. at 121, 637 P.2d at 552.
135. 97 N.M. 243, 638 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1981).
136". 418 U.S. 323 (1971).
137. The following paragraph appeared near the end of defendant's article: "Then for the encore,
the NEWS actually printed a piece by rabid environmentalist Jack Kutz, who used to send us letters
so violent we turned them over to the police." 97 N.M. at 243, 638 P.2d at 1088.
138. Good Gov't Group v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, -, 586 P.2d 572, 576, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 258, 262 (1978).
139. 97 N.M. at 245, 638 P.2d at 1090. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977).
140. 97 N.M. at 246, 638 P.2d at 1091.
141. Id. at 247, 638 P.2d at 1092. See N.M. U.J.1. Civ. ch. 10 (Repl. Pamp. 1980). These
instructions were adopted Dec. 22, 1980, and became effective in Apr., 1981.
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In Ortega v. Montoya, 142 the New Mexico Supreme Court discussed
the final issue addressed in this article. In Ortega, a minor child shot the
plaintiff with a B.B. gun. The question before the court was whether the
trier of fact could award punitive damages in favor of the plaintiff against
the father of the minor child. The court held that the child's tender age
did not preclude willful and malicious conduct for which punitive damages
could be awarded. 43 Following Ortega, the issue of punitive damages in
cases in which the conduct of a minor child caused the injury is a matter
of fact to be decided by the trier of fact rather than a matter of law to
be decided by the court. This decision reflects the recent trend toward
tougher penalties for wrongdoers and more liberal reparation to victims
of wrongdoers.

142. 97 N.M. 159, 637 P.2d 841 (1981).
143. Id. at 161, 637 P.2d at 843.

